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Abstract
Prospect theory and its empirical applications have shown that in some
contexts people make choices based on the value of those choices relative to a
reference point. The resulting mapping from outcomes to utility is called the
value function and it exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. These
properties make the value function an S-curve with a kink at the reference
point. In this paper, we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (n > 250, 000)
to test whether the properties of the value function extend from narrow gam-
bling choices in experiments to yearly changes in earnings evaluated with life
satisfaction. We find that the mapping from changes in earnings to life sat-
isfaction mimics the predicted S-curve remarkably well when the reference
point is generated from individuals’ past earnings. This finding is robust to
a large set of alternative specifications. In congruence with experimental evi-
dence, we find that earnings losses have around 2 times greater impact on life
satisfaction than earnings gains. We emphasize that the S-curve we find need
not be causal, since the changes in earnings were based on observational data.
However, we can rule out that certain other factors produced the observed
relationship, including expected utility theory.
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1 Introduction
When expected utility theory describes the behavior of an agent, the agent is called
rational. To account for observed systematic departures from such rational behavior,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as an alternative theory.
At the core of prospect theory is the value function, which measures the subjective
value derived from the argument in question, such as income or consumption, and
encompasses three departures from rationality. Firstly, the argument of the value
function is defined relative to a reference point. Secondly, it contains loss aversion,
implying that it is steeper for losses than gains. Thirdly, it exhibits diminishing
sensitivity, meaning that it is concave for gains and convex for losses.
Starting from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) the properties of the value function
have been well-documented in experimental settings where subjects are asked to
choose between various gambles. Two elements of the value function, reference
dependence and loss aversion, have also been shown to influence behavior in many
settings outside the lab (see Barberis (2013) for an excellent recent review). However,
diminishing sensitivity, the feature of prospect theory that generates an S-curve, has
remained elusive in non-experimental settings. Indeed, Barberis (2013) concludes
that in empirical applications of prospect theory diminishing sensitivity seems “much
less important.” Shleifer (2012) notes that the value function occasionally is graphed
as a simple piecewise linear function, thus fully neglecting diminishing sensitivity.
In this paper, we test for the existence of an S-curve outside of the lab. We find
that the mapping from changes in earnings to life satisfaction follows the hypothe-
sized S-curve remarkably well. In congruence with previous experimental evidence,
we find that life satisfaction is associated with earnings losses about twice as steeply
as earnings gains. We complement the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
in three important ways. Firstly, we look at experienced utility, as measured by
life satisfaction, rather than decision utility. Secondly, we consider changes in labor
income rather than narrow gambling situations. Thirdly, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, we extend the previous laboratory findings to a non-experimental setting.
For a wider applicability of any laboratory finding, this last step is pertinent, but it
sets challenges to causal inference.1 2
We measure income by self-reported net monthly earnings in logs. Our baseline
reference point is the log of last year’s monthly earnings plus the average change in
1Levitt and List (2007) list multiple occasions where laboratory findings do not extend to the
field. This can happen due to the context in which choices are embedded.
2A fourth departure from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is that we look at realized outcomes.
Consequently, we are not concerned with uncertainty and probability weighting.
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log earnings. We use the log difference as our main explanatory variable, but show
that our results are robust to using level differences or proportional changes. Our
data comes from 30 years of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which
allows our baseline set-up to contain more than 250,000 observations.
We emphasize that we observe the S-curve in non-experimental data. In principle
the S-curve could arise spuriously from expected utility theory if there is a partic-
ular correlational structure between life satisfaction, income changes and income
levels. To test whether this is the case, and inspired by the reference-dependent
utility function in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we test for the presence of the value
function while simultaneously controlling for income levels. We find evidence for
both the S-curve and expected utility theory, suggesting that both theories map
unto experienced utility. This is in line with prior experimental evidence (Harrison
and Rutstro¨m, 2009). In particular, we find that if the median earner experiences a
standard deviation change in log earnings, the value function has roughly twice the
impact on life satisfaction than the standard utility function. For individuals with
low earnings, diminishing utility kicks in and the standard utility function plays a
relatively larger role.
We study at length whether some other omitted variable could be behind the
observed S-curve, such as health status, changes in work hours, job changes, and
lagged income. When controlling for these we still find evidence for the S-curve.
We also test whether our results could be driven by reversed causality. In our main
specification we use individuals’ current income. We conduct robustness checks
where our income measure is the annual household income in the year prior to the
survey. The S-curve remains.
Another potential concern is that diminishing sensitivity arises mechanically due
to the boundedness of the life satisfaction scale, which goes from 0 to 10. Individ-
uals who report 10 out of 10 in life satisfaction and get an income increase above
their reference point cannot increase their stated life satisfaction further. The re-
verse applies to individuals who report 0 out of 10. Three points argue against this
generating diminishing sensitivity. Firstly, rather few individuals find themselves at
the boundary of the life satisfaction scale (4.5% report being 10/10, 0.2% report
being 0/10 and only 1.25% being below 3). If we exclude individuals reporting 0,
1, 9, or 10 our results hold - indeed, they become stronger. Secondly, if diminishing
sensitivity is purely mechanical, any variable positively associated with life satisfac-
tion should generate S-curves as well. We show that this is not the case. Thirdly,
as a robustness check we transform the life satisfaction variable such that responses
close to the boundary carry a larger weight. This does not change the results.
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In sum, we fail to find an alternative explanation for the S-curve and infer that it
is likely that the value function plays a causal role in converting income changes into
utility. Experimental or quasi-experimental downward income changes of varying
magnitudes remain to be studied to confirm the causality of our observed relation-
ship.
In further robustness checks we vary the independent variable, the income vari-
able, the dataset (with the British Household Panel Survey) and the reference point.
We also test the results with various subsamples. The robustness checks suggest that
the relationship is not spurious. However, not all the properties of the S-curve hold
with all specifications. Generally, diminishing sensitivity is more robust to changes
in the specification than loss aversion, which fluctuates between 1 and 4 depending
on the specification.
To our knowledge, we are the first to find that the value function follows the
predictions from prospect theory outside of lab settings. The S-curve has previ-
ously been found using experienced utility in experimental settings (see for example
Galanter (1990) and Carter and McBride (2013)). The most extensive study using
experienced utility in a non-experimental context is by Vendrik and Woltjer (2007).
They look for the S-curve, also using the German Socio-Economic Panel, but where
the reference point is defined as the mean income of a reference group. They observe
a globally concave value function and thus rule out an S-curve with their reference
point. We complement their findings by showing that generating a reference point
based on past earnings does generate an S-curve.
A number of papers have documented elements of the value function by using
experienced utility outside of experiments. For example, Luttmer (2005) and Ferrer-
i Carbonell (2005) find that individuals’ well-being depend on the distance between
their own income and the income of a reference group. Boyce et al. (2013) study
loss aversion using panel data. They observe bigger impacts of losses than gains in
income. De Neve et al. (2014) exploit macroeconomic variation in incomes to study
loss aversion, which they find support for.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theory
and outlines our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our empirical
specification. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
4
2 Theory
At the core of prospect theory is the value function, which has three fundamental
properties: loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and reference dependence.3 The
argument in the value function is changes in income or consumption rather than
levels of income or consumption as in the neoclassical approach. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) argued that people tend to be more sensitive to differences between
small than large changes and more sensitive to losses than gains. Thus, the value
function is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for small losses than
gains, i.e. it exhibits diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. Together with differ-
entiability everywhere except at the reference point, this generates a value function
with an S-shape as shown in Figure 1. The value function is not expected to be pre-
dictive of losses so large that “ruin or near ruin is a possible outcome” (Kahneman,
2003).
Figure 1: Textbook Version of the Value Function
Notes: From the Wikipedia entry on prospect theory.
Let V (∆y) be the value function, where ∆y is changes in y, which in the value
function can be income, wealth or consumption. Income can be the argument of
the value function formulation in its own right or serve as a proxy for consumption.
In principle, differences in consumption and income relative to a reference point
could have independent effects in the value function. In expected utility theory the
argument is always considered to be consumption and income only acts as a proxy
for it.
3Prospect theory also hypothesizes that people tend to overweight small probabilities and un-
derweight large ones. Our focus is on realized incomes for which there is no uncertainty.
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We assume that V (∆y) is continuous for all ∆y, twice differentiable for all ∆y 6=
0, and that V (0) = 0. This notation implicitly assumes that the reference point
is the status quo, that is, no increase in y. Given that the average increase in
real income typically is larger than zero, this may seem like an overly pessimistic
reference point. In our empirical specification we will allow for individuals to have a
larger than zero increase as the reference point. Hence, strictly speaking our value
function will take the form V (yit− rit), where rit is the idiosyncratic reference point
for individual i at time t. For notational convenience we denote yit − rit = ∆y in
this section.
Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Bowman et al. (1999), and Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006), we make three sets of testable hypotheses regarding the properties of
the value function:
H1a: V ′(∆y) ≥ 0 and V ′′(∆y) < 0, for ∆y > 0,
H1b: V ′(∆y) ≥ 0 and V ′′(∆y) > 0, for ∆y < 0.
H1a and H1b define diminishing sensitivity in the positive (H1a) and negative
(H1b) domain.
H2:
lim
∆y→0
V ′(−∆y)
lim
∆y→0
V ′(∆y) = δ > 1, for ∆y > 0,
H2’: |V (−∆y)|
V (∆y)
> 1, for ∆y > 0,
H2”: |V (−∆y)|
V (∆y)
= δc > 1, for ∆y > 0.
H2 defines loss aversion around the reference point, where δ > 1 is the loss
aversion parameter. It implies that very small losses have a larger impact than very
small gains. H2’ is a more demanding definition, which assumes loss aversion holds
for all values of ∆y. H2” is even stronger, as it assumes loss aversion is constant in
the whole domain of the value function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). We denote
the parameter of constant loss aversion δc, defined by Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
and estimated to be around 2.25 over the range of a few hundred dollars in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). Loss aversion for large changes is ambiguously defined and
has taken many definitions in the literature. Kahneman (2003) and Ko¨bberling and
Wakker (2005) only look at loss aversion for small changes (H2), whereas Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assume it holds at changes
of all sizes (H2’).
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Inspired by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we formulate a reference dependent util-
ity function that combines the standard utility function and aspects of the value
function as a third hypothesis:4
H3: u(c|r) = m(c) + n(c|r) ≈ m(y) + V (∆y),
where r is the reference consumption, m(c) is the standard utility function and
n(c|r) is a gain-loss utility function. We approximate the consumption in m(c) with
income, y. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) assume that the decision-maker assesses gain-
loss utility in each dimension separately. We focus on just one general dimension
of consumption as proxied by earnings. Following this specification, we will test
whether both components of the reference-dependent utility function translate into
experienced utility.
3 Data & Empirical Specification
3.1 Data
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is a nationally represen-
tative household survey conducted yearly since 1984. We use data from 1984–2014.
The total sample size meeting our baseline empirical specification contains 41,259
individuals and 251,437 observations. As the measure of value we use life satisfac-
tion, which is the answer to the question “How satisfied are you with your life, all
things considered?” The answer categories range from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to
10 (completely satisfied). A histogram over the answers to the question is given in
Figure 2.
We use self-reported net monthly earnings as the income variable. Only employed
individuals can report any earnings. Thus, unemployed and people outside the labor
market are excluded from the main analysis. The income variable has been deflated
and is expressed in constant 2010 EUR. Income variables that include all respondents
and all forms of income exist at the household level. Most of these other income
measures reflect the income for the year prior to the interview, and as such need
not reflect the income available to the respondent at the time of the interview. We
therefore prefer to use contemporaneous labor earnings. Later on we will show that
4Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) use the terms “consumption utility” and “gain-loss utility.” Since
we make some departures from their model, we will instead use the terms standard utility function
and the value function.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Life Satisfaction
Notes: Histogram of answers to the question, “How satis-
fied are you with your life, all things considered?” 0 means
completely dissatisfied and 10 completely satisfied.
the results also hold when using gross or net household income from the year before
the interview using the entire sample.
3.2 Empirical Specification
In our baseline specification, we estimate the following function:
LifeSatit = αi + V
−(yit − rit)Nit + V +(yit − rit)Pit + it,
where yit is the log of earned income and rit is the reference level of earnings. In
our baseline case we set rit = yit−1 + µt, where µt = 1nt
∑
j∈nt(yjt − yjt−1). That
is, we take the reference point to be last year’s earnings plus the average increase
in earnings in the sample, all in logs. µt ranges from 0.004 to 0.071 over the 30
years of data. The mean over the entire sample is 0.034. We will use several other
reference points as robustness checks. V −(yit − rit) and V +(yit − rit) are estimated
with a fourth order polynomial or using a restricted cubic spline. We use power
functions as robustness checks.5 Pit and Nit are indicators of positive and negative
difference from the reference point. All estimates include individual fixed effects
and at times also year fixed effects (discussion of this to follow). We cluster the
standard errors at the individual level and deliberately interpret the life satisfaction
answers as cardinal. Using an ordered logit model or a related model would take
5We use a fourth order polynomial rather than a higher or lower order polynomial, as the fourth
order minimizes the 10-fold cross validated root mean square error. We prefer this over the power
functions such that we can keep the individuals fixed effects in the regression.
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out information that are useful for the present purposes.
The distribution of ∆yit is given in Figure 3.
6 97.3% of the observations are
contained in the window. A change of log earnings of −1 is equivalent to having
37% (e−1) of last year’s earnings, while a change of log earnings of 1 is equivalent
to having 272% (e1) of last year’s earnings. The histogram of changes from the
reference point, yit − rit, looks almost identical but shifted slightly to the left.
Figure 3: Histogram of Changes in Log Earnings
Notes: Histogram of changes in log monthly net earnings.
We use log differences rather than relative changes for three reasons. Firstly, in
psychology, the Fechner–Weber Law states that subjective sensation is proportional
to the logarithm of stimulus intensity (Fechner, 1912). If the value function follows
from such stimulus intensity sensation, the log difference is an appropriate measure.
Secondly, the distribution of log differences is symmetric, where as that of relative
changes is right-skewed, making log differences a convenient measure. Thirdly, using
relative changes would mechanically make loss aversion more likely. Using logs will
therefore give us a more conservative estimate of loss aversion. Our methodological
choice differs from most of the literature. Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) use the relative
income gap while Carter and McBride (2013) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
use absolute changes. We will show later that using relative differences or absolute
differences still generates an S-shape but that the nature of loss aversion changes.
6The figure masks nominal wage rigidities for three reasons: 1) the earnings are deflated, 2) the
earnings are self-reported, 3) the earnings are after taxes. If we look at the distribution of nominal
self-reported earnings (see Figure A.1), 12% have precisely a zero increase in their earnings, and
30% have a negative change. The 30% figure compares to e.g. Barattieri et al. (2014), who find
that in the U.S., 11.5% of quarterly non-zero gross wage changes are negative.
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4 Results
To start out with, we graphically inspect whether the relationship between changes
from the reference point and life satisfaction follows the pattern we are looking
for. In Figure 4 we regress life satisfaction on a restricted cubic spline of changes
from the reference point. Panel (a) does not contain year fixed effects while panel
(b) does. Both contain individual fixed effects. The splines suggest that we have
evidence for diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion in our data. However, when
using year fixed effects, positive deviations from the reference point are insignificant.
One of the reasons for this could be that year fixed effects take away business cycle
variation. If everyone is having a good year, this will be captured by the year fixed
effects, diluting the variation that the value function can pick up.
Figure 4: Restricted Cubic Splines
(a) Without Year Fixed Effects (b) With Year Fixed Effects
Notes: Panel (a) shows the predicted values from a fixed effects regression of life sat-
isfaction on changes from the reference point. Panel (b) in addition controls for year
fixed effects. We use a restricted cubic spline with 5 knots. Dashed lines indicate 95 pct.
confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We use last
year’s earnings plus the average change in earnings, all measured in logs, as the reference
point.
It is important to note that our choice of reference point is mechanically related
to the amount of loss aversion in this set-up. If we choose a more ambitious reference
point, the vertical line shifts to the right and the amount of loss aversion will be
greater, and vice versa. If the reference point is decreased to about a zero increase
in nominal wages, positive deviations from the reference point are significant when
we use year fixed effects.
The standard deviation of life satisfaction is 1.63 and the standard deviation of
changes in log earnings is 0.34. Based on Figure 4(a), a log earnings loss of 1 standard
deviation is associated with a decrease in life satisfaction of 0.05 standard deviations
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(0.085/1.63). A log earnings increase of 1 standard deviation is associated with an
increase in life satisfaction corresponding to 0.03 standard deviations (0.054/1.63).
Given that much of the variation in life satisfaction is pure noise, we consider these
effects to be of relevant size.
4.1 The Reference Point
The previous discussion imposed a very specific reference point on the respondents,
the reason being that there is no obvious way to define the reference point for the
value function (see Barberis (2013) for a discussion of this). Kahneman (2003) states
that the reference point is “usually the status quo.” In this setting, it seems a bit
implausible that all individuals expect no changes in their real earnings. Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006) assume that the reference point is defined as rational expectations
about outcomes, something which Abeler et al. (2011) find convincing support for.
It is unclear how best to operationalize these expectations, but it is plausible that
individuals rationally expect to have an average increase in earnings.
The GSOEP provides an explicit question that tries to get to the reference point
in the surveys of 1992, 1997, and 2007. The respondents are asked to state what
would be a somewhat inadequate income, a barely adequate income, a good income,
and a very good income in net monthly terms for the household (see Van Praag and
Frijters (1999) for more information on these questions). In addition, in 2002, 2007,
and 2012 individuals are asked what would be the minimum net household income
needed to get by. In Figure 5 we plot a similar graph as before, but now the reference
points are these self-reported, subjective income levels. Hence, rit = yit,good etc. We
use a measure of households’ monthly net income as the income variable to align
the income measure with these particular questions.
It seems to be the case that a reference point just around a barely adequate
income and a minimum needed income generates an S-curve with the amount of
loss aversion found in experimental settings. On average, the income individuals
consider to be barely adequate is log 0.14 lower than their actual income, while they
consider a minimum needed income to be log 0.23 lower.
Note also that the self-reported numbers seem to be a more precise measure of
the reference point. The effects are about five times as large with the subjective
reference points compared to the reference points based on lagged earnings. Thus,
lagged earnings could be considered a noisy measure of the reference point. One
potential reason for this is that lagged earnings are subject to some degree of hedo-
nic adaptation (see Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008;
Kimball et al., 2015). One of the findings in the literature on hedonic adaptation
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Figure 5: Using Subjective Reference Points
(a) Somewhat Inadequate Income (b) Barely Adequate Income
(c) Minimum Needed Income (d) Good Income
Notes: The figure shows the predicted values from regressing life satisfaction on the
distance between net monthly household income and the net monthly household income
deemed necessary by the respondent to have “a good income” etc. All variables are
measured in logs.
is that people expect life events to have a larger effect on their well-being than ac-
tually is the case (see Riis et al., 2005; Ubel et al., 2005). People are not usually
interviewed the moment they hear about their raise in salary. By the time they are
asked about their life satisfaction, they may have partly adapted to the higher or
lower earnings compared to the previous year. As they are asked to state subjective
reference earnings at the same time as they report their income, no such adaptation
takes place and the measured effect is larger.
Fundamentally, it is problematic to use subjective measures of the reference
point, since they are likely to have correlated measurement errors with life satisfac-
tion. An advantage of generating reference points based on lagged earnings is that
we have more than ten times the sample size. Moreover, when using lagged earnings
our results still seem to be driven by individuals that experience earnings changes
above or below their subjective expectations. To illustrate this, we exploit a ques-
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tion where individuals are asked how likely it is that they will get a pay raise within
the next two years. We binarize the answers according to the stated likelihood. For
our results to be driven by unexpected earnings changes, in the positive domain,
the S-curve should be driven by individuals who received an unexpected pay raise.
Conversely, in the negative domain the S-curve should be driven by individuals who
were least expecting a pay cut. Figure 6 shows that this is indeed the case.
Figure 6: The Role of Pay Raise Expectations
(a) Do Not Expect Pay Raise (b) Expect Pay Raise
Notes: The figure shows the predicted values from regressing life satisfaction on changes
from the reference point. Panel (a) includes individuals who expect a pay raise within
the next two years while panel (b) includes individuals who do not expect a pay raise.
For these reasons, our main specification will continue to use reference points
based on the previous year’s earnings. We will further study the robustness of the
results to other choices of reference points later in the analysis.
4.2 Testing the Hypotheses
To test the relationship between earnings changes and life satisfaction more for-
mally, we explore which of our hypotheses that have empirical leverage. We want to
emphasize that our setting is not experimental. Thus, the tests we present here are
not definite and further research is needed. However, we diligently study whether
confounding variables or reversed causality could drive the results.
First, we test H1, i.e. diminishing sensitivity. To make these results presentable
in a table and allow for kink at the reference point, we run the same regressions
as presented in Figure 4, but instead of a spline we fit second and fourth order
polynomials on the positive and negative domain separately. We do so both with
and without year fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Regression Results
Without year fixed effects With year fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd order 4th order 2nd order 4th order
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
y-r 0.15∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.10∗∗ (0.05)
Gain (y-r)2 −0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.15∗ (0.08) −0.03∗∗ (0.01) −0.06 (0.08)
domain (y-r)3 0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
(y-r)4 −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
y-r 0.25∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.05)
Loss (y-r)2 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.09) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.09)
domain (y-r)3 0.15∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.05)
(y-r)4 0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.01)
Within r2 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.016
AIC 760,992 760,976 757,325 757,311
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models contain individual fixed effects and individual-
level clustered standard errors. The reference point, r, is set to last year’s monthly earnings plus
the average yearly change in monthly earnings. n = 251, 437.
The first model uses a piece-wise quadratic relationship between changes in earn-
ings from the reference point and life satisfaction. All four coefficients are highly
significant and have the necessary signs to generate diminishing returns. The same
applies if we include year fixed effects. This is in line with H1. In the second and
fourth specification we use a 4th order polynomial. In the loss domain all higher
order terms are highly significant whereas there is less significance in the positive
domain. Our preferred specification is to use a fourth order polynomial without
year fixed effects. We prefer not using year fixed effects, since we believe they take
out too much of the variation we want to exploit. We think business cycle variation
should be captured by the value function rather than fixed away.
Given the evidence for diminishing sensitivity in the previous specifications we
next test H2, that is, whether loss aversion is present. To test the hypotheses we
need to calculate various statistics that are a function of both the level and slope of
the predicted S-curve. To generate confidence bands around these test statistics we
bootstrap 1000 resamples at individual level clusters. We use the percentile method
to derive the confidence bands. Panel (a) of Figure 7 shows the generated S-curve
with bootstrapped standard errors. It is equivalent to the predictions from the
fourth order polynomial without year fixed effects presented in Table 1. Panel (b)
of Figure 7 shows the corresponding slope of the curve. The slope at the reference
point is significantly larger in the negative domain than in the positive domain. This
is in line with H2.
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Figure 7: Bootstrapped Hypothesis Testing
(a) H1: Level (b) H2: Slope
(c) H2’: Level Difference (d) H2”: Level Ratio
Notes: The graphs display the nature of loss aversion by computing differences and
ratios in the impact of losses and gains. Sample size in all graphs is 251,437. Confidence
bands are generated by 1000 bootstraps resamples at individual level clusters using the
percentile method.
We test H2’ in panel (c). The graph shows whether a decrease of a given
size from the reference point has a larger impact on life satisfaction than a similar
increase. This is the case for all changes from the reference point, which is in line
H2’. In panel (d) of Figure 7 we look at whether loss aversion is constant. We test
whether regardless of the size of the change from the reference point, a loss of a
given size is worse by a constant multiplier than an equivalent gain. This appears
to be the case with a coefficient of around 2. The number is decreasing slightly over
the interval but with fairly large confidence intervals. We want to stress this result
changes slightly if we use other specifications, such as splines or other polynomials.
With some specifications loss aversion is slightly increasing, with others it is slightly
decreasing. It always fluctuates around 2, but with rather wide confidence bands.
This is consistent with the 2.25 reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
In sum, we cannot falsify any of the different definitions of loss aversion. To
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assure that these results are not dependent on the specific functional form we chose,
we test the hypotheses using two alternatives to a 4th order polynomial. We use
the power function as used in Carter and McBride (2013) and a more flexible power
function as used in Vendrik and Woltjer (2007).
Power function : V (yit − rit) =
{
β1(yit − rit)α1 : yit − rit > 0
β2(−(yit − rit))α2 : yit − rit < 0
Flexible power function : V (yit − rit) =
{
β1
(1+yit−rit)1−α1−1
1−α1 : yit − rit > 0
β2
(1+yit−rit)1−α2−1
1−α2 : yit − rit < 0
The results (without individual fixed effects to account for the non-linear speci-
fication) are shown in Figures A.2 and A.3. With these specifications, we are never
able to negate any of the prior findings. Due to wide confidence intervals, however,
we are unable to confirm all of the prior results, particularly whether loss aversion
is constant.
Finally, we test H3; whether individuals’ life satisfaction is increasing both in
the positive distance from their reference point, and in the absolute amount of
earnings that they have. This test is important to make sure the standard utility
function is not behind the S-curve we observe, which in principle could be possible.
If individuals only gain utility from their level of income, and changes in income are
positively correlated with income levels, the S-curve could arise solely from expected
utility theory. We again use a fourth order polynomial above and below the reference
point. Now we also control for log earnings. We use a fourth order polynomial to
be flexible about how the level of earnings is transmitted into life satisfaction. The
corresponding predictions are graphed in Figure 8.
We appear to have evidence for the S-curve and a standard utility function in
line with H3. This finding suggests that expected utility theory and prospect theory
both play an independent role in transmitting income into life satisfaction. We get
slightly less loss aversion when controlling for the standard utility function. This is
likely because large negative income changes are associated with very low current
levels of income, which now are captured by the diminishing marginal utility from
expected utility theory.
In order to put the magnitudes in perspective, consider a person with the me-
dian earnings (1515 EUR). We can calculate the change in life satisfaction this
person would experience from respectively prospect theory and expected utility the-
ory (EUT) if he gained or lost a standard deviation of log earnings (0.34). If the
person lost 0.34 log earnings he would experience a decrease in life satisfaction from
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Figure 8: Testing H3
(a) Prospect Theory (b) Expected Utility Theory
Notes: Predictions from a fixed effects regression of life satisfaction on a fourth order
polynomial of log earnings and a piecewise fourth order polynomial of changes from the
reference point. Both figures cluster standard errors at the individual level. Avg. loss
aversion = 1100
∑1
yit−rit=0.01
|V (−(yit−rit))|
V (yit−rit) , where yit − rit = {0.01, 0.02, ..., 1}.
prospect theory of 0.072 and a loss from EUT of about 0.031. If he gained 0.34 log
earnings he would experience an increase in life satisfaction of 0.046 from prospect
theory and of 0.035 from EUT. Hence, prospect theory seems to have a bigger impact
on life satisfaction than expected utility theory for the median earner. For poorer
individuals, diminishing utility kicks in and expected utility has a larger impact on
life satisfaction.
4.3 Sources of Variation in Income Changes
Since our income changes are not randomized, it is relevant to analyze where they
come from. Broadly speaking, our results can be driven by two sources. Firstly, they
can be driven by income changes we hope are at play, such as changes in work hours,
changes in tax codes, promotions, and job changes. These sources of variation can
pose a potential threat if they have a direct impact on life satisfaction. Secondly,
our results can be driven by any covariate that is positively associated with both life
satisfaction and changes in income or vice versa. This could include lagged income,
age, health status, family status etc. In this section we will argue that the first set
of variables indeed seem to be a powerful source of variation, but that our S-curve
survives even when we control for their direct effect on life satisfaction and for other
covariates.
In Table 2 we regress changes in income on a set of variables belonging to each
of the two potential sources. With regards to the first class, we control for changes
in work hours, voluntary job changes, and involuntary job changes (voluntary: own
17
resignation, employee requested transfer within company, end of self-employment,
involuntary: terminated by employer, temporary contract expired, company trans-
ferred employee, company closed down). With regards to the second class, we con-
trol for changes in health status (proxied by yearly doctor visits), changes in marital
status, change in number of kids, and lagged income.
Table 2: Predictors of Income Changes
Coef SE
Change in Weekly Work Hours 0.0071∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Voluntary Job Change 0.0239∗∗∗ (0.0055)
Involuntary Job Change −0.0538∗∗∗ (0.0078)
Lagged Log Income −0.5028∗∗∗ (0.0058)
Change in Annual Doctor Visits −0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Kids −0.0173∗∗∗ (0.0016)
Single −0.1183∗∗∗ (0.0059)
Observations 209,543
Within r2 0.309
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Fixed effects regression
of changes in income from reference point on a number of potential
mediators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Changes in work hours positively predict changes in income. As work hours
are negatively correlated with life satisfaction, if anything, the direct impact of
work hours has mitigated the S-curve from our main analysis. Positive changes
in health and voluntary job changes positively predict changes in income. This is
potentially problematic for our S-curve, since both are positively correlated with life
satisfaction. Hence, we want to control for these to assure that our S-curve survives.
Lagged income seems to have a lot of explanatory power, whereby individuals with
initially high incomes experience lower income changes. Like work hours, this is not
problematic for our S-curve as income and life satisfaction are positively correlated.
Individuals that become single or get kids experience lower changes in income. It is
not entirely clear how this could impact the observed S-curve.
In order to check if our S-curve is driven by any of these variables, we run
our baseline regression of life satisfaction on a spline of changes in income while
controlling for all of the mediating factors. The resulting predictions are shown in
Panel (a) of Figure 9. The S-curve is almost unchanged, although we have less
evidence for loss aversion.
The impact of work hours on income changes seem to be a particularly important
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Figure 9: Predictions with Controls and Leisure Satisfaction
(a) Predictions with Controls (b) Leisure Satisfaction
Notes: Panel (a) shows predictions from a fixed effects regression of life satisfaction
on a spline of changes from the reference point. The regression controls for changes in
work hours, voluntary and involuntary job changes, lagged log income, changes in yearly
doctor visits, partnership status, and having kids. Panel (b) shows predictions from a
fixed effects regression of leisure satisfaction (answers to how satisfied individuals are
with their leisure on a scale from 0-10) on a spline of changes from the reference point.
driving force. This is apparent if we substitute life satisfaction in our baseline
model with leisure satisfaction. As shown in Panel (b) of Figure 9, distance from
the reference point is negatively associated with leisure satisfaction. This can be
explained if great income changes come from individuals who increase their work
hours accordingly. Again, if anything, this has decreased the strength of the S-curve
we found in the main analysis.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The results until now were based on a number of assumptions with regards to the
dependent variable, the income measure, the reference point etc. In this section
we perform a number of alternative specifications to clarify when the main results
are robust. Table 3 shows an overview of the robustness checks we make. Figures
supporting all of these results are presented in the Appendix. We list whether we
have evidence for diminishing sensitivity (DS ) and loss aversion (LA) separately. We
consider there to be support for loss aversion if LA = 1
100
∑1
yit−rit=0.01
|V (−(yit−rit))|
V (yit−rit) >
1.5, where yit − rit = {0.01, 0.02, ..., 1}. In all cases we use restricted cubic splines
with five knots and control for individual fixed effects.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks
Robustness check Main specification Alternative specification DS LA
Dependent variable Life satisfaction Personal income satisfaction
Household income satisfaction
Work satisfaction
Happiness
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Income measure Self-reported
monthly net earnings
(CPI deflated)
Nominal monthly net earnings
Monthly gross earnings
Monthly gross HH income
Annual net HH income
Annual gross HH income
Annual gross HH earnings
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Survey GSOEP BHPS, monthly net earnings
BHPS, monthly gross earnings
BHPS, annual gross earnings
BHPS, weekly net HH income
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Reference point Lagged earnings
plus average yearly
change in earnings
Predicted log earnings from AR(1)
Predicted log earnings from AR(2)
Peer mean by state
Peer mean by region and educ
Peer mean by region and sex
Peer mean by region, age, sex, and educ
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Transformation of
dependent variable
Cardinal from 0-10 log(lifesat/(10-lifesat)) transformation
Remove individuals at boundary
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Independent variable Difference from ref-
erence point
Income
Log Income
Annual doctor visits
Annual sick days
No
No
No
No
-
-
-
-
Distance measure Differences in log
earnings
Percentage change in earnings
Absolute change in earnings
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Sample All with non-missing
values
Excl. 5% with highest/lowest earnings
Excl. 5% with largest earnings changes
Bottom 50%
Top 50%
Men
Women
West Germany
East Germany
1984-1999
2000-2014
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Notes: All results are based on fixed effects regressions with clustered standard errors at the individual
level. A restricted cubic spline with 5 knots is used in all cases. DS indicates whether there is evidence
for diminishing sensitivity, LA whether there is evidence for loss aversion (loss aversion factor greater
than 1.5).
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Dependent Variable
First we test if the S-curve holds with other subjective well-being variables than
life satisfaction. To this end we utilize a battery of variables in GSOEP where
individuals are asked how satisfied they are with certain domains of their life on a
scale from 0–10. We use questions on satisfaction with job, personal income, and
household income. In addition, we use a question on how often individuals have felt
happy in the past four weeks. The answer categories to this question are very rarely,
rarely, occasionally, often, and very often. The results when using these measures
as the dependent variable are given in Figure A.4.
The results with the domain satisfaction variables are quite similar to using life
satisfaction. In fact, the domain satisfaction results seem to generate more narrow
confidence bans. This is not surprising since earnings changes are more important
when people evaluate satisfaction with their income or job rather than with life
as a whole. We find no evidence for loss aversion when using personal income
satisfaction or work satisfaction. This could be because these measures omit the
impact of income changes on leisure. Alternatively, it could be because individuals
need larger earnings changes to be satisfied with their job than they need to be
satisfied with their life in general.
When the question on happiness is used we get quite wide confidence bans sug-
gesting that this variable is more noisy. Using happiness as the dependent variable
generates neither diminishing sensitivity nor loss aversion.
Income Variable
Next, we test the robustness of our result to using other income measures. The
main results were based on monthly self-reported net earnings expressed in constant
2010 EUR. We try six other income measures. We keep on using the yearly mean
change in the income variable as the reference point. First, we use the same self-
reported income but expressed in nominal values. As shown in Figure A.5 we still
find support for the S-curve. Next, we use self-reported gross earnings rather than
net earnings. We again have evidence for diminishing sensitivity, but this time loss
aversion is minimal. We also try using self-reported monthly net household income.
This variable includes all income sources so now we also include unemployed and
people outside the labor market. With this specification we have evidence for both
loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.
Next, we use income variables from the Cross National Equivalent File, which
contains yearly income measures at the household level. We use both gross earnings
and gross/net income. Since the incomes are measured in the year prior to the
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self-reported life satisfaction, we exclude all interviews conducted after March (31%
of the sample), such that the income measure still is somewhat timely. Due to this
timing effect, these variables make a great test for whether our main results were
driven by reversed causality. Results using these income measures are given in Figure
A.5. We find a perfect S-shape using all of the three measures, but with generally
larger loss aversion. This could be because individuals have smaller expectations for
household income than their personal income and hence use a lower reference point.
Survey
We try to see if our results replicate using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The BHPS is an annual survey that ran from 1991 to 2008. The sample
we use contains 143,000 observations spread across 24,000 individuals. The life
satisfaction question is phrased slightly differently in BHPS. Respondents are asked
“How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?” on a scale from 1 (not
satisfied at all) to 7 (completely satisfied). The BHPS has several income variables.
Here we use four different measures. Results are displayed in Figure A.6.
First we use monthly net earnings, which is similar to our baseline specification
with the German Socio-Economic Panel. We have evidence for diminishing sensitiv-
ity but none for loss aversion. This does not change if we use gross earnings rather
than net monthly earnings. Next we try to use annual gross household earnings,
as this was the variable in the GSOEP that generated the largest amount of loss
aversion. We still have evidence for diminishing sensitivity but not for loss aversion.
Finally, we try to use the measure that probably is closest to what individual feel at
the moment they answer the survey: weekly net household income. Here we have
evidence for both diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion.
In general, however, the results using the BHPS display less evidence for loss
aversion and is more fragile to extreme observations. One explanation for the lack
of loss aversion may be that Brits have higher expectations than Germans. Indeed,
if Brits expect their earnings increase to be around the 80th percentile (such that
4 in 5 get lower earnings increase) then loss aversion re-emerges. It may also be, of
course, that loss aversion simply is non-existing in the British sample.
Reference Point
We also vary the reference point. First we predict each individual’s income using
AR(1) and AR(2) models. We consider the predicted income as the reference point.
Hence, income increases larger than predicted are considered positive deviations
from the reference point and vice versa. Findings are given in Figure A.7. In both
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models we find evidence for both diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. These
results are consistent with the idea that the reference is the rational expectation of
future earnings.
We also use different mean peer earnings specifications as a reference point.
This is what Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) used in their analysis. We construct four
different mean peer earnings measures: i) by state, ii) by region and education level
(three categories), iii) by region and gender, and iv) by region, education, gender,
and age (10 year rolling). Although life satisfaction is increasing in the difference
from the mean peer earnings, the relationship between life satisfaction and these
reference points shows little evidence for diminishing sensitivity and none for loss
aversion. Similar to Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), we therefore find no evidence for
the predictions from prospect theory when using peer earnings as the reference point.
This could either be because prospect theory does not apply to this reference point,
or because the reference groups we can create based on the survey do not capture
who individuals actually compare themselves with. It is plausible that individuals
use specific colleagues, friends or family members as their reference group, which
these broad measures have a hard time capturing.
Transformation of Dependent Variable
A possible concern is that diminishing sensitivity arises mechanically due to floor
and ceiling effects. No matter the income change, individuals cannot report life
satisfaction levels below 0 or greater than 10. We test whether this is driving the
results in three ways. Firstly, we try to transform the dependent variable such that
our new dependent variable equals log( lifesat
10−lifesat). With this transformation there
is further between life satisfaction levels at the boundaries and closer between life
satisfaction levels at the center. Hence, more weight is attached to changes close to
the boundaries. As shown in Figure A.8, this does not change the results.
Secondly, we try to deal with the boundedness concern more directly by deleting
observations where life satisfaction is reported to be 0, 1, 9, or 10. As also shown in
in Figure A.8, this only serves to make our findings stronger.
Independent Variable
The third way in which we see if our results are driven by floor and ceiling effects
is to regress life satisfaction on other variables, which we know from prior research
is positively correlated with life satisfaction. If the boundedness is a concern, we
should see S-curves also in these regressions. We already saw that this was not
the case when we used peer income as the reference point. To study this further
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we regress life satisfaction separately on income, log income, annual doctor visits,
and annual sick days (in the latter two, we look for reversed S-shapes). Results are
displayed in Figure A.9. In neither case do we see an S-shape. This points against
floor and ceiling effects driving diminishing sensitivity.
Distance Measure
Next, we use percentage changes in earnings and absolute changes in earnings rather
than differences in logs. We use the yearly mean percentage change in the sample
(after discarding changes larger than 1000% income growth) as the reference change.
For the absolute changes, we similarly use the mean absolute change (after discarding
absolute changes greater than 10,000 EUR). In both cases the S-curve remains. This
is presented in Figure A.10. The nature of the loss aversion changes, though.
Sample
Finally, we check if the results are driven by the tails of the distributions. We first
look at outliers by removing the 5% most extreme values in terms of, respectively,
earnings levels and changes in earnings. As shown in Figure A.11 in both cases
the S-shape is unaltered. We also try to divide the sample according to whether
individuals are in the top or bottom half of the income distribution. This helps
explain if the results are driven by people that had very low or very high initial
incomes. Overall, we get S-curves in both cases but with loss aversion differing
quite a bit between the two groups.
Next, we divide the sample by gender, region (east/west) and survey year (be-
fore/after 2000). As shown in Figure A.12 we find strongest loss aversion for women,
East Germany, and the later years of the sample.
In sum, we find that our results our robust to most specifications. However,
the amount of loss aversion present changes quite a bit depending on the exact
specification.
5 Conclusion
Prospect theory is one of the most canonical results in behavioral economics in the
past century. The theory holds that individuals derive value not from their absolute
level of income, but rather from changes in income with respect to a reference point.
Two of the ingredients of the theory are that individuals display loss aversion (losses
are valued more heavily than gains) and diminishing sensitivity (large changes from
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the reference point have diminishing marginal impacts), generating an S-curve with
a kink at the reference point.
In this paper, we provided a comprehensive test for these two phenomena using
data on life satisfaction from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Rather than con-
sidering choices under risk, we looked at non-experimental realized outcomes. We
used experienced utility rather than decision utility as the measure of value and
data on last year’s earnings to generate a reference point. Our most naive results,
simply regressing life satisfaction on a spline of changes from the reference point,
revealed an S-curve strikingly similar to experimental evidence. The size of our
data set (250,000+ observations) allowed us to test various specific definitions of
loss aversion. We found that earnings losses have about 2 times greater impact on
life satisfaction than earnings gains. Our main results are robust to a number of
alterations, including using other subjective well-being variables, applying different
definitions of income, and using other reference points. The S-curves remains even
with a large set of controls and alternative definitions of the reference point.
If we in addition control for the absolute level of earnings (rather than only
earnings changes), the S-curves maintains together with a standard utility function,
suggesting that both the income level and changes in income matter. For the median
earner the value function has slightly greater influence on life satisfaction than the
standard utility function.
To our knowledge, we are the first to find that the predictions from prospect
theory with respect to loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity hold with life sat-
isfaction outside of an experiment. This result gives support to applying the value
function in policy analyses as a significant source of well-being.
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A Supplementary Figures
Figure A.1: Histogram of Changes in Nominal Log Earnings
Notes: Histogram of changes in nominal monthly net earn-
ings. Despite the income variable being self-reported and net
of taxes, we see substantial nominal wage rigidities.
29
Figure A.2: Hypothesis Testing with Power Function
(a) H1: Level (b) H2: Slope
(c) H2’: Level Difference (d) H2”: Level Ratio
Notes: Hypothesis testing based on the assumption that the value function takes
the form:
V (yit − rit) =
{
β1(yit − rit)α1 : yit − rit > 0
β2(−(yit − rit))α2 : yit − rit < 0
Confidence bans are generated through bootstrapping 1,000 resamples at individual
level clusters. Sample size in all graphs is 251,437. In panel (d) the confidence ban
is outside the window of the graph. The parameter estimates are as follows:
Parameter Coef SE
α1 0.417 (0.467)
α2 0.549
∗∗∗ (0.082)
β1 0.032
∗ (0.019)
β2 −0.251∗∗∗ (0.020)
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A.3: Hypothesis Testing with Flexible Power Function
(a) H1: Level (b) H2: Slope
(c) H2’: Level Difference (d) H2”: Level Ratio
Notes: Hypothesis testing based on the assumption that the value function takes
the following form:
V (yit − rit) =
{
β1
(1+yit−rit)1−α1−1
1−α1 : yit − rit > 0
β2
(1+yit−rit)1−α2−1
1−α2 : yit − rit < 0
Confidence bans are generated through bootstrapping 1000 resamples at individual
level clusters. In panel (d) the upper confidence ban is partly outside the window
of the graph. The parameter estimates are as follows:
Parameter Coef SE
α1 7.250 (5.156)
α2 −1.803∗∗ (0.720)
β1 0.339 (0.210)
β2 0.559
∗∗∗ (0.106)
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A.4: Changing the Dependent Variable
(a) Personal Income Satisfaction (b) Household Income Satisfaction
(c) Work Satisfaction (d) Happiness
Notes: All variables range from 0-10. Happiness is the answer to how often individ-
uals have felt happy in the past four weeks. The answer categories to this question
are very rarely, rarely, occasionally, often, and very often (coded 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10,
such that the range is comparable to the domain satisfaction questions).
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Figure A.5: Changing the Income Measure
(a) Nominal Monthly Net Earnings (b) Monthly Gross Earnings
(c) Monthly Gross HH Income (d) Annual Net HH Income
(e) Annual Gross HH Income (f) Annual Gross HH Earnings
Notes: Predicted values from fixed effects regressions of life satisfaction on changes
in log income from the reference point. The bottom four figures use the entire
GSOEP sample including unemployed and people outside the labor market. Panel
(c), (d), and (e) include all income sources, not only earnings. The three annual
figures contain income in the year prior to the survey. Individuals surveyed after
March are excluded to align the timing of these measures with the life satisfaction
answers.
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Figure A.6: Changing the Survey: BHPS
(a) Monthly Net Earnings (b) Monthly Gross Earnings
(c) Annual Gross HH Earnings (d) Weekly Net HH Income
Notes: Predicted values from fixed effects regression of life satisfaction on changes
from the reference point. The four income variables are from the British Household
Panel Survey.
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Figure A.7: Changing the Reference Point
(a) AR(1) (b) AR(2)
(c) Peer earnings (by state) (d) Peer earnings (by region & educ.)
(e) Peer earnings (by region & sex) (f) Peer earnings (by region/age/sex/educ.)
Notes: Predicted values from regressing life satisfaction on changes from the refer-
ence point using a variety of different reference points. The bottom four panels use
the mean log earnings of a peer group as a reference point. Education is split into
three categories and age groups are rolling 10 year intervals.
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Figure A.8: Transformations of the Dependent Variable
(a) y=log(lifesat/(10-lifesat)) (b) Removing 0-1 & 9-10 in Life Sat.
Notes: Panel (a) transforms the left-hand side variable to equal log( lifesat10−lifesat )
(individuals with 0 or 10 in life satisfaction are discarded). Panel (b) removes
individuals who report 0, 1, 9, or 10 in life satisfaction.
Figure A.9: Changing the Independent Variable
(a) Income (b) Log Income
(c) Annual Doctor Visits (d) Annual Sick Days
Notes: All panels regress life satisfaction on a spline of the variable in question using
individual fixed effects.
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Figure A.10: Different Distances from Reference Point
(a) Growth in Earnings (b) Absolute Change in Earnings
Notes: Predicted values from regressing life satisfaction on difference distances from
the reference point. As distance measures we use the percentage change from the
year before and the absolute change from the year before. The income variable is
monthly net earnings in 2010 EUR. The reference point is defined as, respectively,
the average yearly growth and average yearly change in earnings after discarding
extreme values.
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Figure A.11: Changing the Sample 1/2
(a) Remove High/Low Earnings (b) Remove High/Low Changes
(c) Bottom 50% (d) Top 50%
Notes: Predicted values using only parts of the sample. Panel (a) excludes individ-
uals below the 2.5 percentile or above the 97.5 percentile of the income distribution.
Panel (b) excludes individuals below the 2.5 percentile or above the 97.5 percentile
of the ‘change in log income’ distribution. The bottom two graphs use only the
lower or upper half of the respondents by their income.
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Figure A.12: Changing the Sample 2/2
(a) Men (b) Women
(c) West Germany (d) East Germany
(e) 1984-1999 (f) 2000-2014
Notes: Predicted values using only parts of the sample. All regressions include
individual fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the individual level.
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